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y research is centered on the arguments of Rene Descartes, a 
17th Century philosopher, in his work The Meditations. The 
Meditations is composed of six entries, which are six meditations, 
written in form of narration. His narrative takes form in an 
intricately composed piece of writing, a clever argument presented through a 
precise and fascinating procedure. However, the artful fashion in which he conveys 
his method is far from an immaculately composed calculation which Descartes 
leads one to believe. In this paper I will present Descartes’ procedural destruction 
and following reassembly of the external world and his proposed discovery of the 
proper foundation of the sciences. I shall then discuss the unmistakable faults in 
his argument, presenting counter-arguments posed by Descartes’ contemporaries 
and further offering my own objections. I will conclude by presenting a theoretical 
epistemology found beneath the surface of the glaring errors which Descartes 
ostensibly failed to recognize.
I. Methodological Doubt
Descartes chooses to exercise some fantasy in his narrative, initially claiming 
that nothing exists. Why is it that Descartes’ Meditations, composed of such 
outlandish claims, remain a prominent piece of philosophical work? It is 
the riddle, comprised of absurd notions and bearing esoteric consequences 
which Descartes presents to begin his inquiries to understand how we know, 
what we know. These notions impel Descartes’ complete upheaval of all 
knowledge and any possibility of our having knowledge. He totally negates 
all of existence, and does so with just three propositions: the refutation of the 
senses, “the dream regress”, and the supposed existence of an “evil deceiver”. 
Assuming total non-existence is hardly a conventional sentiment, and not 
one which any person would readily embrace. However, he so guilefully 
guides one through his thinking that it almost seems possible. Nonetheless, 
the idea that nothing exists is absurd. Reason would indicate that it should be 
a relatively simple task to dismiss the absurd; but this is not the case. The past 
four hundred years of philosophy has failed to offer a solution, and thus it 
has become a thorn in the side of philosophy to once and for all rid ourselves 
of this conundrum. I will begin by elucidating the ways in which Descartes 
brings all of existence into doubt.
Descartes’ radical external world skepticism is an essential element in his 
work. With complete destruction of all knowledge and existence, he clears 
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the table to build his own epistemology. He reaches this radical 
point of skepticism by employing three propositions of doubt 
in his quest for a certain foundation of the sciences. He begins 
by evaluating what he thinks he knows. He states he must reject 
that which is even a potential item of doubt. Thus, to dismantle 
his false beliefs, he must undercut the foundations which 
support them. His ﬁrst move toward complete skepticism is a 
stipulation which asserts that we must not trust that which has 
deceived us even once. Therefore, he continues, since we have 
been deceived by our senses we must not trust them. However, 
this only applies in ambiguous circumstances, so he calls upon 
an argument similar to one employed by the ancient skeptics, 
the dream regress. 
The ancient skeptics employed the argument of the dream 
regress by asking how one knows that what one dreams is not 
actual reality, and conversely; how it is that one knows what 
we perceive as our waking hours not to be the ﬁctitious. The 
ancient skeptics were not seeking to know anything, and in 
fact, they believed nothing could be known; so they committed 
themselves to a total suspension of judgment. This argument 
was one of many they employed to reject claims of knowledge. 
Descartes, on the other hand, places his own twist on the 
ancient tactic and employs the argument to eventually gain 
certainty. He asks if we may ever know we are not dreaming. 
He argues that since everything we experience in reality may be 
experienced identically in a dream, there is no way to discern 
whether or not we are dreaming. However this still leaves 
existence intact, because the elements of dreams resemble the 
elements of the actual world.
To call reality into doubt, Descartes then supposes the existence 
of an all powerful, evil deceiver, a supposition which he asserts 
he cannot know to be false. Descartes supposes that this deceiver 
has tricked him in every moment of what he perceived to be 
life, such that, every feeling and every experience Descartes 
ever had was merely a sequence synthesized by the deceiver. 
Thus he renders himself unto a state of complete uncertainty 
and denial of all known existence, since he cannot be certain 
that this deceiver does not exist. Now let us consider Descartes’ 
recovery from this devastating state of non-existence.
II. Resurrecting Reality
Descartes reestablishes existence in a progression narrated 
through The Meditations. He exits the void of non-existence as 
he ﬁrst stipulates his own existence with the famous revelation of 
“Cogito Ergo Sum” or; I think, therefore I am. This proposition 
evades the doubt of the senses, the dream regress, and even 
the evil deceiver. He must exist, for thought requires a thinker, 
deception requires a deceived, and dreams, require a dreamer; 
thus, he must exist as the necessary subject of these operations. 
Moreover, he exists as a thinking thing, since he discovers 
thought to be his essence. He can conceptualize himself as 
removed from a body, or any form of extended thing, but in 
no way can he separate himself from his thought. Descartes 
claims there is nothing he perceives with greater clarity than 
his own thought, which he realizes through the light of nature, 
an incorrigible faculty he comes to deem as clear and distinct 
perception. He explains this revelation, 
But do I not therefore also know what is required for 
me to be certain of anything? Surely in this ﬁrst instance 
of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain clear and 
distinct perception of what I afﬁrm [....] I now seem 
able to posit everything I clearly and distinctly perceive 
to be true. (Descartes: p.72 Med III)
This light of nature, or clear and distinct perception, is 
his second revelation of truth- that is, his mechanism for 
recognizing truth. 
Utilizing this certainty of his own existence, and this instrument 
of recognizing truth, he moves to investigate what an idea is. 
Since he is a thinking thing, he further wonders what the cause 
of ideas is. To uncover this, he must ﬁrst understand causality. 
He claims that, something may never arise from nothing; and 
further, that whatever is in an effect, must be eminently present 
in the cause. Therefore, something of greater perfection, cannot 
be caused by something of less perfection; and thus likewise, an 
idea may never come from nothing. Descartes then understands 
that there must be an idea that is capable of producing all the 
ideas he has, or may ever, have. This idea, in his calculation, 
must be God, a being of supreme perfection. He derives this 
conclusion from that fact that nothing present in him is able 
to even resemble the perfection which inheres to idea of the 
perfect being. He then concludes that this idea cannot originate 
in himself, but further must emanate from something external; 
that is, from the actual existence of the perfect being, God. Upon 
this perfect and thus necessarily non-deceiving God, Descartes 
then validates clear and distinct perception as an incorrigible 
faculty. Still Descartes maintains, and rightly so, that the senses 
must not be trusted at face value. That is, they are not guaranteed 
to provide actual impressions of reality. Nevertheless, he also 
retracts that they are to be completely rejected. He moves on to 
insist that sensory input must be integrated through reason to 
be validated and veriﬁed as certain. He illustrates this notions 
in The Meditations with an example where he depicts seeing 
people walking from afar, but all one can see is moving hats 
and coats; however, we know through reason that these are 
in fact people. Descartes thus posits that the senses do have 
value in ascertaining truth insofar as they are employed in 
corroboration with clear and distinct perception. Since God, 
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by Descartes’ deﬁnition, cannot be a deceiver, God would not 
bestow upon him such deceptive resources. Now with the senses 
corroborated by reason, and the veracity of which veriﬁed by 
the integrity of God, Descartes validates the existence of the 
external world, setting the proper foundation for the sciences. 
III. Critical Response from Descartes’ Contemporaries
Descartes solves his riddle with the necessary existence of a 
benevolent God. This God, he claims, is the foundation for 
all knowledge. However, assertions made throughout The 
Meditations in establishing God’s existence are dubiously 
conspicuous. If it is the case that the argument as whole can be 
dissected and shown to be erroneous, or at least miscalculated, 
then it would seem it should be more than possible to dissolve 
the initial doubts which provoke these claims. However, such 
a task is anything but simple. Unfortunately the refutation 
of Descartes’ reassembly of the world, in the end, leaves his 
three propositions of doubt (his riddle of complete external 
world skepticism), intact. The magnitude which these three 
doubts span is so immense that ﬁnding a crawl space to evade 
deception may take more than a life time. So it will not be the 
dissolution of the doubts we will consider, but the dissolution 
of the argument presented to solve the proposed nulliﬁcation 
of existence.
Descartes’ argument, from the cogito to the vindication of 
the senses is muddled with ﬂaws. I would like to discuss a 
few of these elements. The ﬁrst to be considered is called The 
Cartesian Circle. As the name implies, it is a charge against 
Descartes for arguing in a circle. This is a fallacious form of 
argument in which one employs the premise, or premises, to 
prove a conclusion, but then uses the conclusion to obversely 
justify the premise, or premises.  
This fallacy couched in Descartes’ prolix was exposed by 
Descartes’ contemporaries, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre 
Gassendi. They were given copies of The Meditations before it 
was publicly circulated to respond and object--and object they 
did. They each presented this very issue in their Objections to 
The Meditations. Arnauld wrote, 
I have one further worry, namely how the author avoids 
reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure what we 
clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God 
exists. But we can be sure that God exists only because 
we clearly and distinctly perceive this. (Arnauld: p.150) 
 
Descartes’ ﬁrst step of committing this crime of argumentation 
occurs through instituting the proposition of clear and distinct 
perception, which he asserted as an incorrigible faculty in 
the beginning of Meditation III. He exercises this faculty as 
he maneuvers his way through his conceptualization of ideas. 
This inquiry leads him to question the modes of causality, 
speciﬁcally the cause of ideas. The combination of these 
examinations ﬁnally leads Descartes to a clear and distinct 
understanding of the initial cause of all ideas, a cause which 
necessarily exists, and that cause must be God. Yet despite 
having previously applied this incorrigible faculty of clear and 
distinct perception, Descartes proceeds to justify the veridical 
nature of this faculty upon God in Meditation IV. So, he 
uses this method to ﬁnd God, despite not having proven the 
method to be valid. He offers no justiﬁcation because initially 
he cannot. Instead, he asserts a rule stating that which is clearly 
and distinctly perceived is always true. Thus, with unjustiﬁed 
means, he arrives at the existence of God. Upon this conclusion 
he then reverts back to show clear and distinct perception to 
be valid based upon this new knowledge of a non-deceiving 
God. Here we see an unwarranted premise which invalidly 
proves a conclusion, followed by the unwarranted premise 
being justiﬁed by the invalid conclusion; this is a text book 
case of begging the question in circular argumentation. Hence, 
his triumphs over the evil deceiver and escape from the dream 
regress have miserably failed. He may know he exists, but 
that is all--if he even knows so much.  Second, we should 
consider a quite interesting problem offered from a position 
of uncompromising logic. This point of view was offered by 
another individual who received an advance copy of the text, a 
Jesuit, Pierre Bourdin. Bourdin wrote to Friar Marin Mersenne, 
a friend of Descartes (and the man responsible for issuing these 
early copies of The Meditations), and said; “I have tried to treat 
him as courteously as possible but I have never seen a paper 
so full of faults” (Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch: 64). He 
provides a few interesting points in response to Descartes’ 
escape from the skeptical abyss through the establishment of his 
own existence. He argues against Descartes’ claim that despite 
an inability to differentiate between reality and dreaming, 
Descartes is nonetheless clearly and distinctly aware that he is 
thinking in any dream; and therefore, must exist as the subject 
of this thought. Bourdin rejects that Descartes may have any 
clear and distinct perception of anything if he is dreaming. 
Since the act of thought which Descartes supposes, may be 
occurring in a dream, it is then also only a dream that this act 
of thought is so clearly evident. Thus, no matter how Descartes 
attempts to pose his clear and distinct thought in regard to the 
dream regress, his supposed awareness is nothing but a dream, 
and hence containing no reality, offering no way out of the 
skeptical labyrinth. 
Bourdin’s next point centers on Descartes’ stipulation of 
complete skepticism, denying all existence. Since Descartes has 
established that nothing exists and has embraced this position, 
for Bourdin, that is the end of Descartes’ road. He claims that 
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this position is intrinsically an eternal catacomb. If in the ﬁrst 
premise nothing exists, it cannot be that anything may follow 
to be established as existing. Bourdin says,
Nothing exists, you do not exist; you are not thinking; 
you are not conscious[....]If the proposition ‘Nothing 
exists’ is true, then the proposition ‘You do not exist 
and you are not thinking’ is necessarily also true[...]you 
insist that the proposition ‘Nothing exists’ is true. 
Therefore the proposition ‘You do not exist and you 
are not thinking’ is also true. (Bourdin: 342) 
Simply, if nothing exists, even oneself, consequently, by 
embracing this claim Descartes subjects himself to an 
inescapable nothingness. Bourdin recommends that Descartes 
adjust his premise to allow himself a possibility of establishing 
certainty of any knowledge.
Further, another critical issue may be raised in relation to 
Bourdin’s perspective. According to Descartes’ theory of 
causation, something cannot come from nothing. If he believes 
this to be true, and if in fact he establishes this state of endless 
emptiness, he cannot, according to his own theory of causality, 
escape this nothingness. Thus, when he does assert that he exists 
as a thinking thing, after the fact of his skeptical annihilation 
of existence, he contradicts his own metaphysics. As he would 
then come from nothing, which Descartes says cannot be. 
Therefore, he cannot be, and the cogito is lost.
IV. Proving God and a Rising Suspicion
Despite the calm elegance and natural comfort offered to 
the reader through the narrative, the argument formulated 
by Descartes is far from pristine. The ﬂaws seem so glaring 
and blatant, that it leaves one with a peculiar wonder of how 
Descartes missed these errors. The fallacy of begging the question 
by circular reasoning is not any secret. It is an elementary form 
of fallacious argumentation and is no minor oversight. In fact, 
it singlehandedly undermines his entire argument. Since God 
is the basis for Descartes’ entire epistemology and this fallacy 
negates the establishment of God, this fallacy negates his entire 
epistemology. These errors are so grave and so evident it gives 
rise to suspicion; could it be that he was not sincere? Even if, 
somehow, Descartes did in fact overlook these factors, what 
may be said about his proof of God’s existence? Aside from the 
exhaustive lengths taken in its prose, it is shocking how feeble 
this proof turns out to be.
In attempting to prove God’s existence, Descartes utterly 
failed. I see no substantial difference between his assessment 
of the cause of ideas parlayed into a proof of God’s existence 
and that of Saint Anselm’s ontological argument as proof of 
God’s existence. Anselm’s argument, of the 11th century, goes 
(condensed) as follows:
1:  God is something than which nothing grater can 
be thought. 
2:  Even a fool must admit that something than which 
nothing greater can be thought necessarily exists 
in the understanding, as this is understood upon 
hearing and what is understood must exist in the 
understanding. 
3:  Something that than which nothing greater can be 
thought cannot exist solely in the understanding. 
4:  Since that which exists in reality is greater than 
that which exists solely in the understanding. 
5: But if that than which nothing greater can be 
thought only existed in the understanding, then 
something greater could be thought than that than 
which nothing greater can be thought. 
6:  But this is not possible, so that than which nothing 
greater can be thought must exist in reality.
 Therefore: God exists. (Anselm: 415)
 However, this proves nothing; there is no actual necessity. He 
simply posits ideas and in an entanglement of concepts and 
prolix, he concludes God’s existence. But all he may really say 
is, if God were to exist, nothing greater could be conceived. 
Much is the same for Descartes; if it were the case that our 
ideas indeed needed a corresponding actuality from which their 
objective reality (our mental image or concept) emanates, then 
God would exist. Further, and related in an even closer manner 
to Anselm’s argument, are the implications drawn by Descartes 
through stipulating the perfection of God. He claims that since 
God is most perfect, and that which exists has more perfection 
than that which is merely conceived, God therefore necessarily 
exists. If it were the case that Anselm’s argument had weathered 
the testaments of time and had truly proven the existence of 
God, Descartes would not have needed to prove God existed. 
However, since Anselm’s argument proved nothing, why did 
Descartes adopt such a similar line of reasoning for his own 
proof?  
Descartes writes with such an air of conﬁdence that deigns to 
identify the one true method of attaining truth and grounding 
knowledge. I appreciate this writing insofar as it displays a 
clever craft of a theoretical epistemology, but in no way can I 
subscribe to the actual content of his fantasy. It is undeniable 
that Descartes was a man of remarkable intellect, so it does not 
seem possible that he was unaware of these defects. However, 
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I do understand the mere occurrence of these mistakes does 
not prove anything. Nevertheless, the barefaced manner in 
which they appear is certainly dubious; and I ﬁnd it outright 
suspicious. The remainder of this paper will explore ideas 
regarding a potential hidden agenda behind The Mediations.
V. Dissimulation Theory
The idea that Descartes had a hidden agenda in his work may be 
formally addressed as dissimulation theory. Louis Loeb explains, 
“According to dissimulation hypotheses, Descartes, in The 
Meditations, intentionally misrepresented important aspects 
of his philosophy” (Loeb: 243). Given the highly speculative 
nature of such hypotheses, there are many different views, or 
approaches, one might take here. I will focus on Descartes’ 
appeal to divine veracity as grounds for the function of clear 
and distinct perception (upon which Descartes would prove 
the existence of the external world,) as an insincere notion. 
To begin, we must understand a tactical inconsistency regarding 
the function of the evil deceiver in Meditation I, contrasted 
with its application in Meditation III. In Meditation I, the 
deceiver is an instrument to raise complete doubt regarding 
sensory experience, and simulates the external world to seem to 
exist when in reality it does not. As Descartes explains, 
I will suppose [...] an evil genius, supremely powerful 
and clever, who has directed his entire effort at 
deceiving me. I will regard the heavens, the air, the 
earth, the colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things 
as nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes. (Descartes: 62)
This is a quite severe assertion pertaining to a vast range of 
doubt. In Meditation III, the deceiver, who remains intact, 
assumes a different application than we see in the Meditation I. 
In Meditation III it is not the material world in question, rather 
it is the deceiver’s potential ability to compromise clear and 
distinct perception: Descartes asserts, 
Because it occurred to me that some God could 
perhaps have given me a nature such that I might be 
deceived even about matters that seemed most evident 
[or clear and  distinct....] On the other hand, 
whenever I turn my attention to those very things 
that I think I perceive with such great clarity, I am so 
completely persuaded by them[...]so long as I think I 
am something, he will never bring it about that I am 
nothing[....] For it is true that I do exist. Nor will he even 
bring it about that perhaps two plus three might equal 
more or less than ﬁve[....]Because I have no reason for 
thinking that there is a God who is a deceiver, the basis 
for doubting[...]is very tenuous and[...]metaphysical. 
(Descartes: 70-71)
How is it that at this point in Meditation III, only with the 
knowledge that he exists as a thinking thing, is Descartes able to 
so drastically undermine the previously attributed ubiquitous 
force of negating existence from the evil deceiver? It seems that 
there is no justiﬁable way. Further illustrating the inconsistency 
of the deceiver’s application is the severity applied to the doubts 
in Meditation I which encompass even arithmetic, as Descartes 
says, “others sometimes make mistakes in matters that they 
believe they know most perfectly, may I not, in like fashion, be 
deceived every time I add two and three or count the sides of a 
square” (Descartes: 61)? Whereas in Meditation III (as we saw 
in the former quote, 70-71), this doubt is rendered “tenuous”.
One thing remains quite clear at this point; Descartes did not 
treat the doubts raised in Meditation III as seriously as he did 
when he initially called them into the picture in Meditation 
I. As Loeb writes, “Descartes constructs the hypothesis of 
Meditation III in a way that enables him to minimize the doubt 
it generates, that is, to treat the doubt as slight in contrast to 
the doubt of Meditation I” (Loeb: 253). This indicates that if 
Descartes was insincere regarding the doubts of Meditation 
III, what must follow is an inspection regarding whether or 
not Descartes was sincere regarding these doubts in the ﬁrst 
instance. However, regardless of his sincerity in Meditation 
I, due to the inconsistent application of these doubts, he 
therefore undermines his solutions to these problems; which 
are his proof of the existence of God, his appeal divine veracity-
-but moreover, the epistemological position placed upon God. 
For if the doubt he is answering is not taken seriously, then 
neither should its solution; or, if the doubt is serious, but 
must be minimized so to be toppled, the solution is rendered 
worthless. Conclusively, if the argument is inconsistent, it is 
invalid and we must not accept Descartes’ proof of God or 
anything which he asserts as contingent upon it. With these 
elements withdrawn, is there an epistemological position we 
may extract from Descartes’ work?
Henceforth we shall regard God as a dispensable element of 
Descartes’ epistemology presented in The Meditations. Now we 
must consider the role of Meditation I, presenting complete 
external world skepticism. The onset of these doubts are set 
forth most sincerely by Descartes; or if not, to at least be 
taken seriously. They ring the bells of the ancient skeptics, 
preaching “ephoche”, employing a transposed “isothenia” 
which shall plague any form of Philosophy; including the 
Aristotelian. However Descartes is in no way a classic skeptic, 
he has birthed a new, modern form of skepticism. Descartes’ 
skepticism reveals his hidden agenda, so whether or not he was 
fully sincere in entertaining the idea of the evil deceiver; he 
fully intended that we should. For his reduction of knowledge 
in itself is a cunning act, as it is assembled to reﬂect, or “to 
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set the stage”, for the introduction of his metaphysics; that is, 
without warrant Descartes induces an epistemological crisis in 
speciﬁc relation to his theory. As Michael Williams claims, “But 
Descartes does not acknowledge the theoretical considerations 
that mandate this reduction of skepticism to a theoretical 
problem in epistemology. Rather, he represents the reduction 
as a condition of making his project practicable” (Williams: 
124). This subvert introduction is seen progressively through 
the presentation of doubts in Meditation I, as he immediately 
attacks the senses, though they are not fully dispelled since 
the concessions made against them only apply to ambiguous 
instances. To completely nullify the senses, and further, our 
ability to differentiate reality from what is ﬁction, he summons 
the dream regress. Finally, he nulliﬁes reality itself with the evil 
deceiver. However that, which remains, even with no sense 
of reality, is the mind. This is the real revelation procured 
through this procedure, and the arrival at this condition was 
not an innocent conclusion which Descartes realized through 
pure introspection. Williams explains, “We see, then, that 
the progressive doubt of the Meditations is informed throu
ghout[....]Descartes’ distinctive skeptical problems, and the 
metaphysical framework that makes it possible to raise them 
are introduced together” (Williams:129). 
It is most evident that Descartes insists the senses take a 
back seat to the intellect. The intellect, for Descartes, is the 
foundation of knowledge. He poses what he believes to be an 
indelible presentation that the intellect, or faculties of reason, is 
epistemologically prior to the senses. That is, as Loeb suggests, 
from The Meditations one might extract, “the conception of 
a hierarchy of cognitive faculties” (Loeb: 254). This is to say, 
there is a foundationalist approach employed by Descartes in 
The Meditations that is not built upon God. The Meditations 
established all truth upon the perfection of God, deeming God 
as most basic. However, as we observe through the method of 
doubt, God itself is lost as nothing exists. Critically, and of 
utmost importance, what is known before God as Descartes 
was confronted with the supposition of an evil deceiver, is the 
fact that Descartes himself exists; that is, the cogito. This is the 
crucial point of divergence from what Descartes presents at face 
value, and what is hypothesized in this theory of dissimulation. 
The most fundamental element to his position is the assertion; 
I think, therefore I am; this piece of knowledge is the most 
epistemologically basic, not God. Therefore, it is the mind that 
grounds the “pyramid” of knowledge without the validation of 
God. Descartes questions in the beginning of Meditation III, 
But do I not therefore also know what is required 
for me to be certain of anything? Surely in this ﬁrst 
instance of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain 
clear and distinct perception of what I afﬁrm [....] 
I now seem able to posit everything I clearly and 
distinctly perceive to be true. (Descartes: 70)
Again, we are introduced to the essential mechanism of 
ascertaining truth, prior to God. This was, however, invalid in 
the literal context of The Meditations, but as we’ve dismissed 
the role of the supreme being, clear and distinct perception 
ﬁts comfortably as the intellectual foundation which prescribes 
our afﬁrmation of beliefs. Descartes expounds on this notion 
when he speaks about “the light of nature,” a notion I take this 
to be synonymous with clear and distinct perception (in a quite 
poetic way), describing the function of our mind in its purest 
form. As Descartes characterizes, “There is [...] no other faculty 
that I can trust as much as this light and which could teach that 
these things are not true” (Descartes: 72). Here we have a notion 
of an incorrigible substratum upon which we may employ the 
formulation of belief. As Loeb writes, “The claim that reason 
is epistemologically basic, and hence epistemologically prior 
to sense-perception in particular, is not itself deduced as a 
consequence of Divine veracity” (Loeb: 257). Hence our ability 
to reason is the mode of which all these faculties and sensations 
will be ﬁltered unto the light of nature.
It is important to consider the process of understanding 
Descartes imposes upon not only as to further illuminate the 
structure of our gaining knowledge but to further disavow the 
Academics. Descartes claims that our errors are “a privation or 
a lack of some knowledge that somehow ought to be in me” 
(Descartes: 82). He further asserts that errors occur as a result of 
our ability to freely choose in action or belief. That is, our free 
choice runs awry as we apply fallible resources of knowledge 
in adjudicating potential choices. This is a misguided and 
perﬁdious procedure which leads one to misjudge, and elect 
false beliefs. This process of vindicating a given proposition, 
or choice, is judgment. Our judgments are the process toward 
of understanding. Our understanding is the process of our 
knowledge. Therefore, it would follow from this line of thought 
why Descartes made such a grandiose stipulation which 
guaranteed veridical inveteracy; “for as often as I restrain my 
will when I make judgments, so that it extends only to those 
matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it 
plainly cannot happen that I err”(Descartes: 87). Therefore clear 
and distinct perception, the pure function of mind (the light of 
nature), is the key to knowledge. These intellectual epiphanies 
occur as a result of the properly functioning, interacting, and 
ordered set of cognitive faculties. That is, the application of 
proper reasoning in regard to matters of judgment. It is the 
role of reason to adjudicate that which is understood and that 
which is confused. For reason can discriminate, or correct, 
any entity with which it is presented. Therefore, and most 
importantly, reason can defy and correct that which is known 
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by the senses, thus, conclusively showing that the senses are not 
epistemologically prior to the mind.  
V. Conclusion
Thus, Descartes does not wish to establish external world 
skepticism. Rather, he wishes to ground the senses and 
knowledge of external existence upon the function of the 
epistemologically prior faculties of the intellect. He buttresses 
this intention upon the stipulation that reason cogitates all 
the sensory input we receive. However, and undeniably so, 
an immense amount of what we know, and who we are, and 
become, is predicated by everything we externally experience. 
For Descartes, this is good and well. Nonetheless, the basis 
of judging and understanding our experiences is not focally 
through the senses--but through the mind. Conclusively, The 
Meditations suggest that knowledge ferments through the 
intellect, whether or not God exists.
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